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Abstract
Bitcoin is a digital currency and electronic payment
system operating over a peer-to-peer network on the
Internet. One of its most important properties is the
high level of anonymity it provides for its users. The
users are identified by their Bitcoin addresses, which
are random strings in the public records of transac-
tions, the blockchain. When a user initiates a Bitcoin-
transaction, his Bitcoin client program relays messages
to other clients through the Bitcoin network. Monitor-
ing the propagation of these messages and analyzing
them carefully reveal hidden relations. In this paper,
we develop a mathematical model using a probabilis-
tic approach to link Bitcoin addresses and transactions
to the originator IP address. To utilize our model,
we carried out experiments by installing more than
a hundred modified Bitcoin clients distributed in the
network to observe as many messages as possible. Dur-
ing a two month observation period we were able to
identify several thousand Bitcoin clients and bind their
transactions to geographical locations.
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1 Introduction
Bitcoin is the first widely used digital currency, devel-
oped by Satoshi Nakamoto after the beginning of the
financial crisis in 2009 [14]. A distinctive feature of
Bitcoin is that there is no central authority overseeing
transactions, users are connected via a peer-to-peer
network where they announce any transaction they
wish to make. Transactions can then be validated by
anyone using the publicly available list of transactions,
the blockchain, which is in turn generated in a proof-of-
work system. Cheating (e.g. including invalid transac-
tions in the blockchain) thus would require one entity
to control more than 50% of the computing power that
users dedicate to generating the blockchain. In accor-
dance with the decentralized nature of the system, the
specifications of the network protocol is publicly avail-
able, while several open-source client programs imple-
menting the protocol exist [18].
One of the key characteristics of Bitcoin is the high
amount of anonymity it provides for its users [19]. Al-
though one can learn the details of the transactions
via the blockchain, it is still unknown who the users
initiating those transactions are. This is possible since
as there is no authority overseeing the operation of
the system, users do not need to provide any form of
identification to join; anyone with an Internet connec-
tion can download a client program, which then allows
them to generate any number of Bitcoin addresses that
they can use in the transactions to send or receive Bit-
coins. This results in that the identity of Bitcoin users
is only revealed if they publish their Bitcoin address
or this information is intercepted in some way outside
the Bitcoin system. While anonymity is not among
the main design goals of the Bitcoin system [19], Bit-
coin is widely considered as a highly anonymous way
of performing financial transactions and is often uti-
lized for illegal uncontrolled payments [6], along legal
uses where the involved parties do not wish to disclose
their identities to controlling entities in the traditional
financial system, e.g. banks or governments.
In the paper, we present a probabilistic model based
on the information propagating over the Bitcoin net-
work, which gives the possibility of identifying the
users initiating the transactions. In this case, identi-
fication means binding the transactions to the IP ad-
dresses where they were created.
The basic idea consists of two main steps. First, the
probability is determined for each transaction that a
specific client (identified by its IP address) created it.
Assuming that the creator of the transaction controls
the Bitcoin addresses from which money is sent in it,
this step then results in possible IP address – Bitcoin
address pairings. Next the most likely Bitcoin address
– client pairings are identified by combining the prob-
abilities in the list of pairings compiled in the previous
step. This is further elaborated by grouping Bitcoin
addresses that belong to the same user with high prob-
ability based on the transaction network. Finally, the
geographical localization of the IP addresses opens the
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door for a large scale analysis of the distribution and
flow of Bitcoin.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 discusses the relevant characteristics of Bitcoin
and provides the necessary background for the further
sections. In section 3, the mathematical model used
for the deanonymization is explained. The data col-
lection is described in section 4. Section 5 presents
the results of the application of the model. Finally
the method described in this study is compared to the
related works of the topic in section 6.
2 The Main Characteristics of
Bitcoin
In order to use Bitcoin one has to connect to the Bit-
coin network using an open-source client program [18].
In this work, we concentrate on the Bitcoin Core
client [18], whose source code we inspected and mod-
ified for the purpose of data collection. By de-
fault, this client establishes eight connections to other
clients. If there is a link between two clients, they
are connected. Clients exchange information of differ-
ent types, e.g. the transactions they know about, their
state, cryptographic signatures and others through the
network. This is necessary for the validation of the
transactions as it is done by the entire network.
In case of Bitcoin transactions, Bitcoin addresses
play similar role as the bank account numbers in reg-
ular currency transactions. However, there are two
major differences:
• each user may have as many Bitcoin addresses as
they would like to
• and multiple source and destination Bitcoin ad-
dresses can be involved in a single transaction.
In case of the Bitcoin Core client program that was
in operation at the time of the measurement, when a
user initiates a transaction, the client program (the
originator) relays a message to a randomly chosen
connected client in every 100ms time interval. This
method is referred to as trickling, and its goal is to
hide the source of the transaction. The clients receiv-
ing this message (which are not the originators of the
transaction) use a slightly more complex algorithm to
further send the information. Besides trickling, they
also relay the message to the other clients with a prob-
ability of 1/4 (in every 100ms). We expect that other
types of clients apply the same mechanisms to protect
the privacy of the users.
We note that as of today, the previously described
mechanism for relaying transactions has been changed
in the case of the Bitcoin Core client. Currently every
client maintains a queue for the messages to be relayed
for each connected clients and relays them according
to a Poisson process. The parameter of the process is
5 sec for incoming connections and 2.5 sec for outgoing
connections. In this work, we consider the previously
described method which was in use during the time of
our data collection; we believe that our model could
be used for the latter case as well with minor modifi-
cations.
In accordance with the previously described
methodology, the network relies on clients relaying
transactions to have them spread throughout the en-
tire network. As a consequence an arbitrarily chosen
client is not necessarily directly informed about the
transaction by the originator (see Figure 1)
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Figure 1: A new transaction is initiated by the client
“S”. At first it informs the clients denoted by “I” (they
are informed directly from the originator, so only the
trickling method is used for the relay). Then, these
clients relay the transaction further – among possibly
other I type clients – to the ones denoted by “II”.
As no state, bank, institute or organization controls
or ensures the validity of Bitcoin transactions, crypto-
graphic methods are used by the whole Bitcoin com-
munity for this purpose. The security of Bitcoin is
based on the blockchain. In this study the source Bit-
coin addresses, the destination Bitcoin addresses, the
timestamps and the transferred volume of Bitcoin is
extracted from the blockchain for each transaction.
If the owners of the Bitcoin addresses were known,
the blockchain would reveal all of the transactions of
each Bitcoin user. The open nature of the system
mitigates this concern, as anyone can generate any
number of Bitcoin addresses without having to reveal
their identity. Nevertheless, if a Bitcoin address can
be linked to someone (either because they share it in
order to receive Bitcoins or by any other method), the
transaction history of that Bitcoin address can be triv-
ially retrieved from the blockchain. Thus, keeping the
association between Bitcoin addresses and real identi-
ties in secret is crucial for users who wish to maintain
their privacy.
2
3 A Bayesian Method for the
Identification of Bitcoin Users
In this section we present the methodology to assign
probabilities to the distinct IP address – user pairings,
which consists of three main steps.
An overview of the process is illustrated in Figure 2.
Identify
the Transactions’
Possible Originator
IP Addresses
Group Bitcoin
Addresses
Assign
IP Addresses
to Users
Blockchain
Figure 2: Main Steps
First, the propagating messages are observed and
recorded by several monitoring clients in order to cover
as great part of the network as possible. For each
transaction, monitoring clients record the list of clients
who relayed the transaction in the first time segment
(see the definition in the next subsection). They are
the possible originators of the transaction. After some
theoretical considerations, we assign probabilities to
each client that show the probability of them being
the originator, separately for each transaction that we
recorded.
Next, the blockchain is used to group the Bitcoin
addresses owned by the same user. Additionally, the
blockchain also enables to calculate the balances of the
users for further analysis.
Last, by having possibly several transactions of
the same Bitcoin address and the grouping of Bit-
coin addresses by user allows us to combine mea-
surements from multiple transactions to identify users
with higher confidence. By combining the probabili-
ties from the first step, the users (and their balances)
are paired with the clients that are most likely the orig-
inators of their transactions. The clients can be geo-
graphically localized through their IP addresses, which
allows the determination of the geographical distribu-
tion and flow of Bitcoins.
Step 1: Individual Probabilities
Let us consider a single transaction observed by one
monitoring client.
A monitoring client connected to the originator does
not necessarily receive the message from the originator
first, because in some cases it can be relayed faster
through a mediator client (Figure 3).
Orig Mon
Med
trickling
late
tr
ic
kl
in
g
ea
rl
y
relayfast
Figure 3: The message can be routed faster from
the originator (Orig) to the monitoring client (Mon)
through a mediator (Med) in the shown scenario.
One iteration of sending messages happens every
100ms time interval. Let us first calculate the prob-
ability that the originator relays the message to the
monitoring client in one specific iteration. If the orig-
inator has corig clients connected to it (among which
one is the monitoring client), then in every iteration
there is 1/corig probability, that it relays to the moni-
toring client.
Porig1 =
1
corig
In case of the mediator client, it relays the transaction
to the monitor client with a probability of 1/cmed be-
cause of trickling, and it relays with a probability of
1/4 if the other mechanism is used.
Pmed1 =
1
cmed
+
1
4
(
1− 1
cmed
)
=
1
4
− 3
4cmed
The probability that a specific client relays the
transaction in the k-th iteration, follows a geometric
distribution.
Porigk = P
orig
1
(
1− Porig1
)k−1
Pmedk = Pmed1
(
1− Pmed1
)k−1
Let us consider the route on Figure 3 when the orig-
inator sends the message to the mediator, and then
the mediator further relays it to the monitoring client.
To calculate the distribution of the iterations for the
route through the mediator client, the sum of the two
random variables has to be considered. This can be
derived from the discrete convolution of the above two
distributions.
Porig + medk =
k−1∑
i=1
(
Porigi + P
med
k−i
)
=
=
Porig1 Pmed1
(
1− Pmed1
)k−1
1− Porig1
k−1∑
i=1
(
1− Porig1
1− Pmed1
)i
=
=
Porig1 Pmed1
Pmed1 − Porig1
[(
1− Porig1
)k−1
− (1− Pmed1 )k−1]
As every ordinary client initiates 8 outgoing connec-
tions when connecting to the network, the number of
connections is estimated to be 16 (taking into account
the incoming connections as well).
3
If the two routes on Figure 3 are considered inde-
pendent from each other, the probability of the di-
rect route being shorter (i.e. requires less iterations) is
0.6334.1 The goal is to determine a time frame that
the monitoring client has to wait after receiving the
message first until surely receiving it directly from the
originator, if they are directly connected. If this wait-
ing time is defined to be 2 sec, the above model gives
a probability of 0.8071 for the direct route taking less
iterations.
Since the time of our data collection, the trickling
mechanism has been changed in the case of the Bit-
coin Core client, so that relaying can be described by
Poisson processes. In this case a similar calculation
could be utilized but the waiting time will need to be
adjusted to a value which maintains a high probability
for the direct route. However, this does not change the
further steps of our model except from the derivation
of the above probabilities.
To successfully relay a transaction to another client,
three messages have to be exchanged. First, the sender
informs the receiver about the transactions it knows
about (“INV” message). Then the receiver asks for
the new, unknown transactions in the answer (“GET-
DATA” message). Finally, the actual information is
sent to the receiver (“TX” message). As three mes-
sages need to be exchanged sequentially, the delay of
the network plays an important role in the message
propagation. The more mediator clients are involved
in the transmission of the transaction, the longer the
time it takes for the message to get to the monitoring
client from the originator.
If we take into account the network delay, and that
the above described “worst case scenario” (i.e. that
we are connected to the originator, and an indirect
route consisting of one mediator exists) is unlikely, we
can neglect the probability that a message is received
from an indirect route earlier than two seconds before
receiving it from the originator. This assumption is
experimentally verified in [2].
We call this time interval the first time segment of
the transaction and denote it by t1 = 2 sec. If the
monitoring client is not connected directly to the orig-
inator, it will only receive the transaction via possi-
bly multiple indirect routes. Nevertheless, it will be
true with high probability that connected clients that
do not belong to this first time segment are not the
originators of the transaction. We then proceed with
this assumption to estimate the probabilities of a client
being the originator of the transaction based on each
received transaction.
As of today, this mechanism has changed, so that
the relay can be described by Poisson processes. In
this case a similar calculation can be utilized, except
from the fact that the probability of not belonging to
the first time segment can not be neglected.
From the perspective of a monitoring client, the
1Here we have not taken into account the network delay, and
that multiple indirect route can exist from the originator to the
monitoring client possibly consisting of more steps. With this
model however, we can approximate the probabilities.
other Bitcoin clients can be classified to sets based
on each transaction according to Figure 4. Some of
the Bitcoin clients relay the message to it in the first
time segment. This constitutes a subset of the Bitcoin
clients to which the monitoring client is connected to
at the time of the transaction. Only active Bitcoin
clients are connected to the network, but not all of the
clients are working at the examined moment.
Before the transaction, no information is known,
thus the best estimate we can make is that each Bit-
coin client has equal probability of being the originator
of the transaction, resulting in a uniform probability
distribution among the active clients (left side of Fig-
ure 4). After the transaction, each Bitcoin client in
the first time segment can be either the real originator
of the transaction or a client relaying it (via several
hops). Furthermore, the real originator can also be
among the rest of the network, not connected to our
monitoring client. On the other hand, based on the
previous arguments, we presume that clients not relay-
ing the transaction in the first time segment are cer-
tainly not the originators of the transaction. Thus, the
probability of the first time segment clients increases
while the connected clients not belonging to the first
time segment will have zero probability (right side of
Figure 4). Still nothing is known about the clients
not connected to the monitoring client, therefore their
probabilities will not change. Also, clients belonging
to the same subsets can not be distinguished.
Let us calculate the probabilities of being the orig-
inator for clients in each set. The Roman font type
notations of Figure 4 are used for the sets. The num-
ber of elements in the sets is denoted by | · |. C denotes
that the monitoring client is connected to the origina-
tor of the transaction, O denotes that the originator
relays the message in the first time segment to the
monitoring client and F means that a randomly cho-
sen client from the first time segment is actually the
originator of the transaction. Using these notations,
we have that
P (C) =
|C|
|A|
as inactive clients can not be the originator of the
transaction. If the monitoring client is connected to
the originator, it is going to inform the monitoring
client in the first time segment. At this time all of the
first time segment clients have the same probability of
being the originator.
P (O|C) = 1 P (F|C) = 1|F |
Let us apply the law of total probability for P (F).
P (F) = P (F|C) · P (C) + P (F|C) · P (C) = |C||A| |F |
where we exploited that a client can not send any mes-
sages in the first time segment if it is not at all con-
nected to the monitoring client: P
(
F|C) = 0.
The above formula gives the probability assigned to
the first time segment clients. The connected clients
4
All Bitcoin Clients
A
ctiv e C lients
(A
)
C
o
n
n
e c t e d C l i
e n
t s
(
C
)
First Time
Segment
Clients (F)
(a) Before Transaction
All Bitcoin Clients
A
ctiv e C lients
(A
)
C
o
n
n
e c t e d C l i
e n
t s
(
C
)
First Time
Segment
Clients (F)
(b) After Transaction
Figure 4: Relation of the different sets of clients. The darker the subset is, the higher the probability of a client
in that subset is the originator of the transaction.
not belonging to the first time segment have zero prob-
ability. The rest of the active clients has the same
1/ |A| probability. We note that these probabilities
still sum up to 1: probabilities among the connected
clients were “redistributed” according to whether they
belong to the first time segment.
So far we only considered one monitoring client.
If there are more monitoring clients the above men-
tioned sets are defined separately for each of them, and
then the union of the corresponding sets is determined,
i.e. F (txi) = ∪Nj=1Fj(txi) and C(txi) = ∪Nj=1Cj(txi)
for N monitoring clients, where the subscripts denote
the corresponding sets as observed for transaction txi
by the jth monitoring client. Using this method, mon-
itoring Bitcoin clients do not need to be synchronized
in time. If time synchronization among monitoring
clients was achieved, we could further limit the F set
of first time segment clients to those that broadcast
the transaction in t1 time after any of our monitoring
clients first received the transaction. In our experi-
ments, achieving reliable time synchronization was not
possible, so the union of sets was used as described.
We note that the set of active clients at a given time
(A) is not straightforward to estimate even with a large
number of monitoring clients. To do that, we would
need to perform an active network discovery over the
peer-to-peer network of Bitcoin clients. Instead of im-
plementing this functionality ourselves, we relied on
the Bitnodes.io database [20], which provides the es-
timated number of active Bitcoin clients as a function
of time (i.e. |A|). The actual set is not required for the
calculations, only the size of the set at the time of the
transactions is considered.
Step 2: Grouping the Transactions Belonging
to the Same User
The next task is to group the Bitcoin addresses accord-
ing to the users they are owned by. After this, every
transaction can be assigned to the users by looking at
the source Bitcoin addresses of the transaction.
To group addresses, we exploit that Bitcoin ad-
dresses appearing on the input side of the same
transaction typically belong to the same user. This
assumption is employed widely in the literature as
well [1, 11, 15, 17].
This can be used for grouping individual Bitcoin
addresses. The process is demonstrated in Figure 5.
The left side of the figure shows the transactions and
the input Bitcoin addresses where the Bitcoins are sent
from. These Bitcoin addresses belong to the same user.
When a Bitcoin address appears in different transac-
tions (marked red and bold), all Bitcoin addresses can
be merged and assigned to the same user. Although
Bitcoin users are encouraged to generate new Bitcoin
addresses after every transaction they make, so that
the above grouping is less efficient [5], most of the users
do not follow this guideline [10, 13].
The transactions belong to the user that owns its
input Bitcoin address(es).
Step 3: Combining Probabilities – Naive Bayes
Classification
From the message propagation it can be determined
how likely the clients are the originators of the trans-
actions. So far we considered the transactions inde-
pendently from each other.
According to our assumptions, the transactions be-
longing to a single user were created by a few origina-
tor clients. This means that these transactions provide
5
Transaction 1
1BsWmvFJ4oqgVVvs1cFE
1BdVGd582jsQYBeLYqtg
16LAiE7S3pfA53U5E
1M6xUmHyKpvWtcusg4k3
Transaction 2
16LAiE7S3pfA53U5E
19dqKRxDpsfRmQnRAd22
1C3xKJaMG1C2yQXfmfG
Transaction 3
1Nw39NH5eRRtmqcPwRTc
1EMcpdDbY6W53mDWou
1DbD7zFjYSQRiATc8dHx
User 1
1BsWmvFJ4oqgVVvs1cFE
1BdVGd582jsQYBeLYqtg
16LAiE7S3pfA53U5E
1M6xUmHyKpvWtcusg4k3
19dqKRxDpsfRmQnRAd22
1C3xKJaMG1C2yQXfmfG
User 2
1Nw39NH5eRRtmqcPwRTc
1EMcpdDbY6W53mDWou
1DbD7zFjYSQRiATc8dHx
Figure 5: Grouping of Bitcoin addresses: the left side shows three transactions and the input Bitcoin addresses
of these transactions, while the right side indicates how these Bitcoin addresses are grouped.
probabilities for the same set of originator clients. The
originator clients can be identified more efficiently by
combining the probabilities belonging to these transac-
tions, thus obtaining a more decisive result. This can
be calculated by the naive Bayes classifier method [12].
Table 1 shows the transactions (denoted by tx) created
Table 1: The transactions of a single user (tx) assign
probabilities to the clients (IP addresses), which shows
the likelihood that the client is the originator of the
transaction. P (IPi|txj) denotes the probability that
IPi address created the txk transaction
IP1 · · · IPi · · · IPn
tx1 P (IP1|tx1) P (IPi|tx1) P (IPn|tx1)
tx2 P (IP1|tx2) P (IPi|tx2) P (IPn|tx2)
· · ·
txj P (IP1|txj) P (IPi|txj) P (IPn|txj)
· · ·
txm P (IP1|txm) P (IPi|txm) P (IPn|txm)
by a single user. The transactions assign probabilities
to the clients (IP addresses), which indicate the likeli-
hood that the client is the originator of the transaction.
If the ratio of the connected clients is small, the in-
dividual probabilities in the table are also low. The
probabilities of an IP address related to the different
transactions can be combined by the naive Bayes clas-
sification, resulting a row of combined probabilities.
This shows how likely the IP addresses belong to the
examined user.
The IP addresses will be divided into two classes, to
the “originator” and the “non-originator” classes. For
each transaction, there can be at most one IP address
in the originator class. On the other hand, as a user
can use multiple IP addresses to create Bitcoin trans-
actions, after combining multiple transactions, more
than one IP address can be in the originator class in
the final result.
It is assumed that the Bitcoin users can be iden-
tified by a limited number of IP addresses they use
when connected to the Bitcoin network. This involves
that the users do not use TOR (“The Onion Router”),
proxy servers or other similar systems hiding their IP
addresses. If this does not hold, i.e. the users use TOR,
the probabilities would be distributed among several
IP addresses thus resulting in small final probabili-
ties. We note, that the invalidity of this assumption
for some users does not result in false IP address –
user pairings: only those users will be identified whom
the assumption holds for. Furthermore, previous work
showed that the usage of the TOR network can be pre-
vented by an active malicious attacker by connecting
to the TOR network as well and sending malformed
Bitcoin messages via the TOR exit nodes [2, 3]. This
kind of attack would result in users being unable to
connect to the Bitcoin network via TOR. In the cur-
rent work however, we limit our analysis to regular
users, i.e. who connect to the Bitcoin network using
only a few IP addresses.
By the application of the naive Bayes classi-
fier (see Appendix 7 for the detailed derivation),
the combined probability of an IP address (IPi)
belonging to the Co originator class is given by
P (IPi ∈ Co|tx) = 1
1 + exp
[
(1−m) ln
(
|A| − 1
)
+
m∑
k=1
ln
(
1
P(IPi∈Co|txk) − 1
)]
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where tx denotes the vector of all considered transac-
tions, |A| is the average of the total number of active
clients through the transactions2 and m is the number
of transactions.
We note that the naive Bayes classification can only
be applied if the transactions provide conditionally in-
dependent probabilities. Otherwise the dependencies
between the transactions should be determined [16].
4 Data Collection
During the data collection campaign, we used our
modified Bitcoin clients to connect to the network
and monitor information about transactions relayed
by connected clients. As the program code is open-
source, it was straightforward to implement a moni-
toring client.
Our monitoring clients logged the incoming “INV”
messages along with the IP address of the sender client
and the time of reception. These messages contain
the 128-bit hash code of the transactions which are
relayed.
Using this hash code, the Bitcoin addresses, the
amount of Bitcoin sent and other information of in-
terest can then be looked up in the blockchain.
In order to monitor as large part of the Bitcoin net-
work as possible, the modified Bitcoin clients were in-
stalled simultaneously to 140 computers located at dif-
ferent parts of the world, and all of these were record-
ing the observed traffic during the campaign. Bitcoin
clients behind firewalls usually do not allow incoming
connections, i.e. our monitoring clients can not estab-
lish connections to them. By using a large number of
monitoring clients, it is more likely that Bitcoin clients
behind firewalls initiate connections to some of our
monitoring clients when they enter the network. We
installed the monitoring clients on computers that are
part of PlanetLab, a system maintained for network
communication research. [7]
The data collection campaign took slightly
more than two months between 10/14/2013 and
12/20/2013. During this period 300 million records
were obtained, in which 4 155 387 transactions and
124 498 IP-addresses were identified. The collected
data was imported into an SQL database server.
To calculate the probabilities described above, the
total number of active clients need to be determined.
From the Bitnodes.io database [20] one can look up the
number of active IP addresses of the Bitcoin clients as
a function of time.
5 Results
When calculating the combined probability of each IP
address belonging to the specific user, the question
arises when should a pairing be accepted? As more
than one IP address can be used by each user and one
2The |A| number of active clients varies through the trans-
actions as they occur in different times. Thus, the |A| average
of the different |A| values is used as it is suggested in [8].
IP address can be used by several users, no restric-
tion is made of this kind. A pairing is accepted, if its
probability is higher than 0.5. This means that the
IP address of interest has at least 0.5 probability of
being used by the user. Figure 6 shows the distribu-
tion of the probabilities of the accepted pairings. It
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Figure 6: Distribution of the Probabilities Assigned to
the Accepted User – IP Address Pairings
can be seen, that the vast majority of the probabil-
ities are above 0.9, the avarage value of the pairings
is 95.52%, so we expect the false positive rate of the
results to be low. To the best of our knowledge, the
best deanonymization attempt so far could achieve a
success rate of at most 0.34 [2]. Two peaks can be
observed on the figure, one with a maximum at 0.952,
and another close to 1. The first peak is due to usual
clients that initiate a relatively small number of trans-
actions. We speculate that the other peak consists of
servers offering wallet services, i.e. servers that can be
used by several people thus initiating a lot of transac-
tions (see below in more detail). The more initiated
transactions can be taken into account, the higher the
probability will be that can be assigned to the pairings.
As a result, 22 363 users could be identified, and
altogether 1 797 IP addresses were assigned to them.
The imbalance is caused by three outstanding IP
addresses to which 20 680 users are assigned. These
IP addresses probably belong to Bitcoin wallet ser-
vices, which can be used for creating transactions on a
website without using a private computer. Note that
the incomplete grouping of Bitcoin addresses can also
result in an IP address being associated with several
groups of Bitcoin addresses. These groups actually be-
long to the same user, but they could not be connected
in the grouping algorithm.
For the remainder data, 1.14 IP addresses belong
to one user on average. This is due to the fact that
a user can use multiple IP addresses when connecting
to the Bitcoin network. The maximum number of IP
addresses identified as belonging to a single user is 8.
7
Calculating the Balances
Examining the blockchain data alone allows to investi-
gate the time evolution of user balances before, during
and after the data collection campaign.
Figure 7 shows the total balance of all identified
users versus time. The time interval in which the data
collection was taking place is marked by a shaded area.
Before data collection, the amount of Bitcoin owned
by the identified users is increasing. This is due to
the fact that some of the identified Bitcoin addresses
were created before the beginning of the measurement
campaign. After the measurement, some of the iden-
tified Bitcoin addresses were not used anymore, and
other new unidentified Bitcoin addresses took over
their place. The steep drop during the measurement
is probably due to the significant increase of exchange
rate in this time interval, which probably inspired the
users to sell their Bitcoins for traditional currencies.
We found a significant, −0.91 linear correlation coef-
ficient between the total amount of Bitcoin owned by
the identified users and the exchange rate during the
measurement period.
The total number of Bitcoins in use is constantly
increasing as time goes by. At the time of the mea-
surement ∼ 13 500 000 Bitcoins were in circulation.
The amount of Bitcoins owned by the identified users
reached a maximum of 432 666 on 10/25/2013, which
corresponds to ∼ 3.2% of the total amount of Bit-
coins. We believe that this ratio is a statistically rep-
resentative sample, if the data were collected with uni-
form random sampling. However, systematic differ-
ences could have affected the data collection as users
in different parts of the world, with different intentions
and technical backgrounds were possibly operating dif-
ferently in the network. The users could be protected
by firewalls, thus banning incoming connections, and
they could also obscure their operation by using VPN,
proxy service or TOR.
Geographical Distribution of Bitcoin and the
Cash Flow
The location of IP addresses can be determined from
publicly available databases such as MaxMind [21],
which contains approximate locations of the IP ad-
dresses. If the Bitcoin users use additional tools to
hide their IP addresses, or if the IP addresses are lo-
cated at other positions than they are registered to, the
database gives false location results. However, these
inaccuracies are not relevant in the vast majority of
the cases.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of the identified Bit-
coin clients. The coloring represents the logarithmic
value of the density. The identified Bitcoin clients are
mostly located on the more developed regions of the
world. Note that in some countries, such as Russia or
China, the Internet is regulated, therefore some inter-
ference of the connected clients (and their messages)
can occur.
By the localization of the IP addresses, the geo-
graphical distribution of Bitcoin can also be deter-
mined (Figure 9). This figure only shows the distri-
bution of the Bitcoins that are owned by the iden-
tified clients; the coloring is logarithmic. The snap-
shot belongs to the end of the data collection period,
12/20/2013.
The analysis detailed in Section 3 results in a data
set of transactions and identified originators. It is
worth to examine if some originator addresses can be
mapped to receiver Bitcoin addresses as well. There
are 68 973 transactions in which both sides could be
found, and altogether 196 971 Bitcoins were trans-
ferred in the identified transactions. In these trans-
actions 7 372 users appear as senders and 6 170 appear
as receivers.
The transactions are visualized on a world map (Fig-
ure 10). The thickness, opacity and saturation of the
arrows express the amount of Bitcoin transferred in
the related transaction. The time course of the trans-
actions is demonstrated on a video that can be found
at www.vo.elte.hu/papers/2017/bitcoin/
supplementary/transactions video.mp4.
Let us have a look at the flow of Bitcoin between the
different countries, which is illustrated in Figure 11.
As the vast majority of the identified Bitcoin transac-
tions belongs to a few countries, only the top ten most
significant ones are shown in the figure. 87.5% of the
Bitcoins in our data set were transferred between these
countries.
The different countries are indicated by arcs on the
perimeter of the figure. The colors of the links are
identical with the color of the country where the Bit-
coins were sent from. A high amount of the Bitcoins
(24 250 Bitcoins, more than 12.3% of the total amount)
are transacted internally in the United States. There
are several interesting connections: the second largest
flow is between Germany and Argentina (25 508 Bit-
coins, 13.0% of the total amount), and there is a signif-
icant Bitcoin flow between China and the Netherlands
as well.
6 Related Work
There have been several works discussing the
anonymity concerns of Bitcoin. All of them show that
the statistical processing of a huge amount of seem-
ingly insignificant information can take the attacker
closer to reveal the identity of people using Bitcoin.
Androulaki, et al. [1] evaluated the privacy of Bit-
coin by analyzing the system using a simulator. After
grouping Bitcoin addresses they used behavior-based
clustering techniques (K-Means and Hierarchical Ag-
glomerative Clustering algorithms) to bind the Bitcoin
addresses to real users.
Reid and Harrigan [15] used mainly offline data pro-
cessing of the blockchain to analyze the transaction
graph. They identified its clusters and components,
and analyzed the degree distribution of the user net-
work. They also showed that the analysis of publicly
available data from social websites and forums can also
reveal the Bitcoin addresses of some users, similary to
previous work in different contexts [9].
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Figure 7: Balances of Bitcoin users identified in our study and the Bitcoin exchange rate. The shaded area
corresponds to our data collection period.
Biryukov, Khovratovich and Pustogarov provided a
method which connects the users to IP addresses [2].
They connected to all publicly available Bitcoin nodes
(servers) and listened the messages they were relaying.
They used Bitcoin’s peer discovery mechanism to link
transactions to their originators even if these do not
accept incoming connections: the servers that broad-
cast the newly connected clients’ IP addresses were
assumed to be the same set of servers which first re-
layed their transactions. The difficulty of this method
is that a lot of connections have to be established to
reach good results as the number of the servers in-
creases. On the other hand, it promises results for
Bitcoin clients which monitoring nodes cannot directly
connect to (e.g. because they are protected by firewalls
and connect to a limited). In contrast, our methodol-
ogy requires direct connections to the originators and
we thrive to achieve this by running a lot of Bitcoin
clients accepting a large number of incoming connec-
tions. While they use a fixed number of message re-
lays to infer the local network of the originator, we
use a short initial time span for message broadcasts
to infer the actual originator. A further main dif-
ference in our methodology is combining information
from many transactions and linking addresses based
on the blockchain to provide more transactions per
Bitcoin user in that step. Our probabilistic approach
could be combined with the methodology in [2] in or-
der to identify the “hidden” Bitcoin nodes with higher
probability. This also allows linking Bitcoin address
groups belonging to the same user based on them be-
ing originated from the same client, even if these ad-
dresses would not be possible to link based only on the
blockchain.
Koshy et al. also monitored the messages about
the transactions and they classified the transactions to
distinct relay patterns [11]. After applying heuristics
to determine the possible owner IP addresses of the
transaction, they computed simple aggregate statistics
to filter out the correct Bitcoin address – IP address
pairings for both input and output addresses.
Venkatakrishnan et al. proposed a new message re-
lay mechanism called dandelion, which could prevent
the nodes to be deanonymized with a high probabil-
ity [4]. They proposed that the message propagation
should have two phases: first, the message is sent to
exactly one randomly chosen connected client for a
random number of hops by every client, and after the
first phase the message could be further broadcast with
a Poisson process from the nodes received the transac-
tion. The authors also highlighted that requirements
of the high level of anonimity and low latency are
properties that can only be improved at each others
expense.
Basically the following common methods are used
to reveal the identities of Bitcoin users:
1. analysis of transactions with multiple input and
grouping the input Bitcoin addresses of the same
transactions;
2. analysis of Bitcoin flow in the transaction graph
using clustering techniques;
3. analysis of propagating network-layer information
to bind their content to the users,
4. and finally using publicly available information
(e.g. in forums) to connect Bitcoin addresses to
identities.
The methodology presented in our work combines the
1 and 3 types of approaches, mainly based on statisti-
cal processing of network propagation properties.
9
Figure 8: Distribution of the Identified Bitcoin Clients (1/100 km2)
Figure 9: Distribution of Bitcoin Owned by the Identified Clients on 12/20/2013 (1/100 km2)
Figure 10: The Flow of Bitcoin
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Figure 11: The Flow of Bitcoin Between Countries
7 Conclusions
In this paper we examined the problem of user iden-
tification in the Bitcoin network. While Bitcoin pro-
vides a significant level of anonymity as Bitcoin ad-
dresses can be generated freely and without providing
any form of personal identification, the requirement to
announce new transactions on the peer to peer network
opens up the possibility of linking Bitcoin addresses to
the IP addresses of clients. Our main goal was evalu-
ating the feasibility of this procedure.
We installed a modified Bitcoin client program on
over a hundred computers, which recorded the propa-
gating messages on the network that announced new
transactions. Based on the information propagation
properties of these messages, we developed a mathe-
matical model using naive Bayes classifier method to
assign Bitcoin addresses to the clients that most prob-
ably control them. As a result, Bitcoin address – IP
address mappings were identified. Through the IP ad-
dresses of the clients, we could determine their geo-
graphical location, which enabled the spatial analysis
of distribution and flow of Bitcoin.
The method is cheap in terms of resources, the used
algorithms are relatively easy to implement and can be
combined with other Bitcoin-transaction related infor-
mation.
All monitoring clients behaved as regular Bitcoin
clients during the measurement. Although they did
not generate any transactions, the source code can be
modified to do so if a better concealment is required.
Furthermore, the monitoring clients do not need to be
connected to other Bitcoin users in any detectable way
(i.e. communication among them is trivially achieved
outside the Bitcoin protocol), making it virtually im-
possible to reveal their monitoring activity. This raises
the question if the Bitcoin network might already be
monitored by a similar methodology. It can be im-
plied that Bitcoin users should take further steps to
adequately disguise their real IP addresses and pre-
serve their anonymity.
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Appendix - Derivation of Naive Bayes Classifier Method
The model classifies the clients into the originator and non-originator classes (Co and Cn respec-
tively) based on their IP addresses and by considering m transactions. Transactions are denoted
by tx = {txi}, (i ∈ [1; m]).
Consider a single IP address, and let us examine the probabilities that the different transactions
assign to it. Using the Bayes theorem the probability of belonging to the originator class is
P (IPi ∈ Co|tx) = P (IPi ∈ Co)P (tx) P (tx|IPi ∈ Co)
where P (IPi ∈ Co) is the frequency of Co class (a priori probability). By assuming that the
probabilities P (tx|IPi ∈ Co) are conditionally independent, the expression can be simplified.
P (IPi ∈ Co|tx) = P (IPi ∈ Co)P (tx)
m∏
i=1
P (txi|IPi ∈ Co)
Bayes theorem can be applied again to the factors in the product.
P (IPi ∈ Co|tx) = P (IPi ∈ Co)P (tx)
m∏
i=1
P (IPi ∈ Co|txi)P (txi)
P (IPi ∈ Co) =
m∏
i=1
P (txi)
P (tx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
const
·
m∏
i=1
P (IPi ∈ Co|txi)
P (IPi ∈ Co)m−1
The first factor is constant (depends only on the data), and it can be eliminated by the normal-
ization of the probabilities. As P (IPi ∈ Co|tx) + P (IPi ∈ Cn|tx) = 1 is valid,
P (IPi ∈ Co|tx) = 1m∏
i=1
P(IPi∈Co|txi)
P(IPi∈Co)m−1 +
m∏
i=1
P(IPi∈Cn|txi)
P(IPi∈Cn)m−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
const
·
m∏
i=1
P (IPi ∈ Co|txi)
P (IPi ∈ Co)m−1
=
=
1
m∏
i=1
P(IPi∈Co|txi)
P(IPi∈Co)m−1 +
m∏
i=1
(1−P(IPi∈Co|txi))
(1−P(IPi∈Co))m−1
·
m∏
i=1
P (IPi ∈ Co|txi)
P (IPi ∈ Co)m−1
The expression can be simplified further.
P (IPi ∈ Co|tx) =
m∏
k=1
P(IPi∈Co|txk)
P(IPi∈Co)m−1
m∏
k=1
P(IPi∈Co|txk)
P(IPi∈Co)m−1 +
m∏
k=1
(1−P(IPi∈Co|txk))
(1−P(IPi∈Co))m−1
=
=
1
1 + P(IPi∈Co)
m−1
(1−P(IPi∈Co))m−1 ·
m∏
k=1
(1−P(IPi∈Co|txk))
m∏
k=1
P(IPi∈Co|txk)
P (IPi ∈ Co) is the initial frequency of occurrence of the clients in the Co class, which is 1/ |A|.
Although a Bitcoin client can use multiple IP addresses in the network, it is assumed that the
1/ |A| value is a good approximation for the initial frequency in the vast majority of the cases.
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The total number of active clients varies with time in the scale of all considered transactions.
Thus, the |A| average of the different |A| values is used as suggested in [8].
P (IPi ∈ Co|tx) = 1
1 +
(
1
|A|
1− 1|A|
)m−1
·
m∏
k=1
(
1
P(IPi∈Co|txk) − 1
) =
=
1
1 +
(
|A| − 1
)1−m
·
m∏
k=1
(
1
P(IPi∈Co|txk) − 1
) ,
This formula brings in a technical problem. Huge numbers are multiplied together in the
product, which become significantly biased in regular number representations by rounding and
may result in overflow. To relax this problem, the second term of the denominator is written in
an exponential form.
P (IPi ∈ Co|tx) = 1
1 + eξ
,
ξ = (1−m) ln
(
|A| − 1
)
+
m∑
k=1
ln
(
1
P (IPi ∈ Co|txk) − 1
)
.
This results in the following practical formula.
P (IPi ∈ Co|tx) = 1
1 + exp
[
(1−m) ln
(
|A| − 1
)
+
m∑
k=1
ln
(
1
P(IPi∈Co|txk) − 1
)]
This formula enables us to combine the probabilities assigned to the IP addresses by the
transactions.
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